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Antisubmarine Warfare technology has made significant
advances since World War II. However, this thesis is based
on the assumption that training for ASW Surface Officers has
not kept pace with this rapid technological growth. This
thesis proposes that the career pattern for surface officers
desiring in-depth ASW training be modified to improve this
situation while allowing surface officers to maintain a
viable career pattern in the Surface V/arfare community.
Such a career pattern seems to be feasible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis deals with the relation between surface
officer career patterns and surface force antisubmarine war-
fare proficiency. The antisubmarine warfare officer Addi-
tional Qualification Designator (AQD) program and a Career
Plan for SOSUS-experienced ASW officers are two examples of
career related activities which should increase ASW profi-
ciency. The purpose of this thesis is to suggest additional
ways of complementing these kinds of ASW career programs.
Further research, in addition to that which is presented
here, would be beneficial. In particular, research should
be done in assessing present day ASW planning and tactics.
This could be done, in part, by compiling statements and
evaluations concerning the present ASW situation in the Fleet
from as many Destroyer Commanding Officers and ASW Officers
as possible, and by reviewing present ASW training techniques,
This additional research should not necessarily be limited to
the areas mentioned above, since its purpose would be to pro-
vide an adequate data base for the continuation of the gen-
eral theme of this thesis.
Traditionally, the Surface Warfare Officer has been a
Jack-of-all-Trades , Master-of-None . Antisubmarine Warfare
technology and operations have become sufficiently complex
that without specialization, today's ASW officer will find
it difficult to perform effectively. A career pattern

specifically designed for an officer wishing to pursue ASW
in depth would be one solution to alleviating this problem.
Such a career pattern should not remove an officer from the
basic Surface Warfare Officer career pattern, but it should
be one which would both enhance the officer's surface warfare
capability and improve the Navy's ASW capability.
In the first part of this thesis, a definition of the ASW
problem, both past and present, is given. The thesis then
pursues the psychological effect that an ASW specialist
career pattern might have on prospective ASW officers. For
example, an established career and goal pattern might serve
to motivate young officers to raise their performance levels.
Higher levels of training would lead to more knowledgeable
officers and officers who would feel more competent in car-
rying out their duties. As a result, this would increase
their involvement in their work. Mackie (1972), in his
article "The ASW Officer ' Jack-of -all-Trades , Master of None'",
written for the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , emphasized
these points. Supporting comments were gathered from the book
" Careers in Organization ", by Hall (1976), and from the tech-
nical paper, "A Portion of the Sixth NSIA Report on ASW",
distributed by Honeywell (1970).
In the last part of the thesis, an ASW officer special-
ist career pattern will be proposed. To reiterate, this
career pattern will be an extension of the existing SWO
career pattern and, in addition, it should not hamper an
officer in his quest for Command. Also, changes and

improvements in present training procedures will be recom-
mended in order to meet future Anti-Subarmine Warfare require-
ments.
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
As commented by Wright (1973) in an article written for
the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Anti-Submarine War-
fare in recent years has become a highly technical, sophis-
ticated operation. ASW hardware currently in use and proposed
for future use will continue to increase in complexity. Son-
ars, such as the AN/SQS-26 and the AN/SQS-53 (an improved
SQS-26) have added new dimensions to the are of Anti-Submar-
ing Warfare. Long range active and passive sonar operations
have fast become the rule vice the exception. The versatile
Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) helicopter and
its associated equipment have significantly upgraded surface
ship ASW capability. The technological advances made in ASW
have been staggering, to say the least. A question which
can be asked is : What has happened in regard to training and
career development for ASW officers during this same period?
During this period of significant technological improvement
there has been less corresponding improvement in surface
officers' Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities through im-
proved officer training. Many procedures and tactics

introduced fifteen to twenty years ago are still being taught
today at the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer schools.
The training period at the schools has been extended by only
two weeks, from six weeks to eight weeks, since World War II.
At sea training time and submarine services for many ships
have been sharply reduced and as a result, the training an
officer received at the Anti-Submarine Warfare Officers
school might well have been the most comprehensive ASW train-
ing he received as a junior officer. (A portion of the
Sixth NSIA Report on ASW (1970)).
Improvements must begin at the assignment level. A sam-
pling of officers presently serving in destroyer-type ASW
officer billets showed that eighty seven percent had had no
sea experience prior to entering the ASWO school. These
young officers were thrown into a world of standard conning
procedures and ship characteristics, in addition to the ASW
training, with no practical experience whatsoever. There
is such a great deal of information to be absorbed, and all
within a short two month period. Instructors at the Fleet
Anti-Submarine Warfare Officers School in San Diego, Cali-
fornia, have indicated that their present training program
is in the process of being extended to accommodate more
trainer time, but will be extended only by three weeks. This
cannot be regarded as a significant improvement. After com-
pletion of this short ASW training, the officer reports
aboard a ship and is immediately put into a position where

he may have to match wits with a submarine officer who has
received very intensive training prior to reporting aboard.
Prior to commencing their first sea tours, submarine offi-
cers attend a six-month Submarine Officers Basic Course,
followed by a ten-week weapons system trainer. Those offi-
cers slated for duty aboard nuclear submarines attend Nuc-
lear Power School and Nuclear Prototype School for a period
of one year. (Unrestricted Line Officer Career Planning
Guidebook, NAVPERS 15197). This situation can be likened
to the amateur against the professional. The surface ASW
officer is a product of a system which seems to have been
designed to make him anything but an expert.
Appendix A gives a complete listing of all the subjects
covered at the Pacific Fleet Anti-Submarine VJarfare Offi-
certs' School and the number of classroom hours and trainer
hours allotted to each subject. An examination of Appendix A
suggests that the times allotted allow only a scratching of
the surface in many subject areas. The characteristics of all
ASW weapons must be covered in three and one half hours (3.5).
In nine (9) hours of class time spent discussing submarines,
an ASW Officer is expected to learn operational characteris-
tics, basic tactics, Soviet submarine capabilities and limita-
tions, Soviet submarine sensors and weapons, and U. S. Submar-
ine capabilities, limitations, sensors and weapons. The study
of ASVJ aircraft is limited to two (2) hours of class time.
Only twenty two (22) hours of class time is spent studying the
complex AN/SQS-26 sonar system. Four hours are spent in the
10

trainer and if classes are large, some students may not receive
even this much trainer time. One can conclude from this infor-
mation that the Fleet ASW Officer course is comprehensive in
scope but in no way does it give enough time to allow for
more than a superficial understanding of these topics. This
comment is supported by Mackie (1972) and the NSIA Report on
ASW (19 70).
The following comments concerning procedures in the Royal
Navy and the Canadian Navy were gleaned from personal inter-
views with representative officers of the two services.
The Royal Navy, in contrast to U. S. practices, requires
an officer to have between four and six years of experience
prior to beginning his ASW specialization. The officer spends
one year as a cadet ensign, then one year involved in general
at-se,a training. After a six month ashore training period,
the officer returns to sea for a junior officer tour, usually
of two to three years duration. In the past, the Royal Navy's
ASW specialist was known as the Torpedo Anti-Submarine Officer
(TAS), but recently the duties of the ASW specialist have been
taken over by the Principle Warfare Officer (PV/0). Prior to
being selected for PWO training, an officer must be a quali-
fied Of f icer-of -the-Watch (OOW). PWO training lasts for nine
months and includes technical training on ASW systems and
practical experience, as well as AAW and Communications.
Similarly, Canadian Officers must spend one year at sea
in a training squadron during which time they receive their
OOW qualification. After reporting aboard a fleet ship, they
11

are assigned to a department in which they remain for most of
their junior officer tours. If the assignment is to weapons/
operations , the officer attends a four month ASW procedural
course where he receives training on attack planes and ship
maneuvers during ASW operations. Returning to the ship, the
officer assists in the Combat Information Center (CIO during
all ASW situations. After completion of this tour, an officer
may then be selected to attend department head school as a
weapons/operations specialist. This course is from thirteen
to fifteen months long. Since the Canadian's AAW capabilities
are limited, the majority of this instruction is spent on ASW
and surface action. In the ASW portion, heavy emphasis is
placed on intelligence, equipment functions, oceanography and
tactics
.
Two points stand out in these comparisons: (1) Before any
specialization begins. Royal Navy and Canadian officers must
have previous at-sea experience and an OOW qualification and
(2) Once assigned to the weapons/operations department, an
officer remains in that area and receives extensive ASW train-
ing.
Research for this thesis in the area of ASW officer school
training included the interviewing of officers presently serv-
ing as ASW Officers on board Destroyer-type ships. Appendix C
lists the various questions asked and gives a summary of the
comments received. Time and ships' operations were limiting
factors in regard to the number of officers available for
interviews. Therefore, the following comments are not neces-
sarily a representative sampling of the majority of ASW
12

Officers presently in the Fleet. Many of the views voiced by
the different officers were similar in content: (1) The scope
of the training they received was adequate, but many subjects
were not given the proper amount of time for any in depth
appreciation. (2) A substantial portion of the information
presented was aimed at WW II ASW tactics and many modern devel-
opments and equipments were ignored or discussed only in pass-
ing. (3) Not enough time was spent on the advantages and
potential of passive ASW. (4) A very limited amount of time
was spent on ASW weapons and their proper employment. (5)
Trainer time on modern sonars was deemed inadequate. As com-
plex as these systems are becoming, it would seem logical that
more emphasis be placed on their operation and performance
characteristics. (6) Training for multi-ship operations and
coordinated ASVJ between surface, air, and subsurface units was
very limited. This last comment demands further discussion.
The age of the "single" Destroyer ASW mission is over and the
age of coordinated operations has arrived. Longer range active
sonars, increased passive capabilities and non-acoustic sens-
ing techniques have made it nearly impossible for a Destroyer,
by itself, to perform effective ASW (Wright, 1973).
In defense of the Fleet ASW Officers' School, many ships
have not taken advantage of the training opportunities offered
by the school. This problem was brought out in interviews
with ASW instructors at the Fleet ASW Officer School in San
Diego and ASW officers presently serving aboard Destroyers.
This seeming lack of interest begins right at the Command
13

level. Instances have occurred where neither the Command-
ing Officer nor the Executive Officer has attended a ship's
scheduled trainer session, even though there is a require-
ment for at least one of them to be present. In addition,
ships have sent the wrong people, not enough people, and in
many cases, inexperienced people to participate in the
trainers. The net result is improper utilization of trainer
time
.
The goal of a ship whose primary mission is antisubmarine
warfare is to conduct ASW operations in a professional and
efficient manner. Lack of knowledge and experience will
severely hamper the attainment of this goal. Brandenburg
(1964) has observed that this was as much a problem in 1964
as it is now:
"In the average ASW Destroyer today, the Commanding
Officer has only a vague idea of the tactical capa-
bilities and limitations of his ASW weapons . He has
a passing acquaintance with oceanography, but is at
a loss to discuss its implications regarding sonar
performance much beyond the level of depth. He knows
there are tactical procedures for coordinating his
ship's operations with those of ASW aircraft, but he
is not sure which ones apply to which type aircraft.
He knows that ASW aircraft sometimes employ sonobuoys
,
but he does not know the characteristics of the more
common types, nor at what distances his ship's noise
is likely to interfere with them. He is aware that
enemy submarines probably have electronic intercept
equipment , but is uncertain as to the range at which
an enemy submarine could detect his ship's electronic
emissions. He knows neither the launch geometry
required by his ASW torpedoes nor their acquisition
ranges. He knows that ASW helicopters have dipping
sonars, but is not familiar with their capabilities
relative to his own ship's sonar; and so it goes --
on and on and on."
Thirteen years have passed since Mr. Brandenburg wrote




Commanding Officers may still not possess sufficient ASW
skills to fully comprehend the staggering volume of data
available and make the correct decisions when decisions are
required. Much of the burden has been placed on the young
officer who has just graduated from two months of ASW Offi-
cer's School and who has probably never been to sea before.
These problems were brought out during interviews with ASWO
Officers serving in the San Diego area. The more data being
made available about the oceans and the more sophisticated
equipment being introduced into the fleet makes it more appar-
ent that ASW is no longer reducible to a few simple thumb
rules and a handful of tactics.
The ASW Officers' problem has been compounded even fur-
ther regarding his association with the men in his division.
Brandenburg again states:
"If he is to demand top performance from his hardware
and crew, he must know just what constitutes top per-
formance. He must know what kinds of data his sensors
can provide, and with what reliability. He must know
the realistic limits and abilities of his weapons. He
must know how to weigh sensor information and to infer
tactical intelligence from it. He must know just when
to bring his weapons into action for maximum effect.
He must understand in detail the enemy's capabilities
and limitations, his strengths and weaknesses, his
tactical history, and probably courses of action."
If the ASW Officer is knowledgeable in the many facets of ASVJ,
he then gains the respect of his men and increases his com-
petence as a supervisor. But serious consequences can result
it the ASW Officer is deficient in terms of his background
and knowledge. (Mackie (1972); Brandenburg (1964)).
15

The ASW Officer is responsible for assessing data and
recommending courses of action to be taken based on that data.
If he receives improper information, data that is less than
accurate or intermittent, and is unable to fully grasp the
situation because of his lack of training and limited experi-
ence, he may be unable to initiate a tactical response which
will be correct and appropriate for the problem with which he
has been confronted.
The ideal working condition exists where knowledgeable
,
well-trained men are working together harmoniously and where
these men are properly utilizing the ASW equipment for which
they have been trained. If the equipment does not function
properly, old parts are replaced with new and the system is
continually calibrated to ensure it is giving accurate and
reliable information. The same type of concern has not always
been given to the men who must use the equipment.
A statement in the article, "A Portion of the Sixth NSIA
Report on ASW" (1970), sums up the entire ASW problem very
adequately
:
"The human subsystem remains the most vital component
of any ASW system. Yet the human subsystem has never
been accorded the same developmental emphasis as the
hardware subsystems. The hardware is carefully engin-
eered, specialized, and perfected to a high degree in
an effort to effect maximum performance, reliability
and efficiency. The human subsystem, in contrast, is
treated as a general purpose module , theoretically
capable of functioning with high and equal efficiency
in any hardware environment. The combination of a
highly specialized hardware subsystem and a general-
purpose human subsystem results in an ASW system with
performance limited not by hardware capabilities, but
by the human understanding of those capabilities."
16

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF A CAREER PATTERN
It would seem rather doubtful that any enthusiasm could
be generated in the ASW community if there remains an absence
of stability of assignment and lack of carefully developed
career opportunities. It is difficult for an individual to
develop pride in his work if his particular job does not seem
to be given much importance by his seniors. Also, if there
is a lack of stability of assignment or a well developed
career plan where an officer can have the opportunity to ad-
vance based on his performance, then there results a lack of
motivation.
Career people have tended to see their jobs and career
involvements in relation to the way these things affect them
personally. Career development can be broken down into two
basic categories: (1) A career as a means for advancement,
and (2) a career as a profession or status passage. There-
fore, an established career and goal pattern would be extremely
beneficial in inspiring a junior officer to perform with in-
creased professionalism. A sampling of junior officers pres-
ently serving as ASW Officers in the San Diego area revealed
that 6 3% of those officers sampled stated they were in favor
of a career pattern for ASW specialists and would pursue such
a career if it were made available.
Professional people have tended to do better work and have
displayed greater enthusiasm if they considered their jobs to
be interesting and purposeful. But those who have been thrown
17

into positions which were not completely to their liking have
had greater tendencies to perform below their capabilities.
In the sampling of officers previously mentioned, half of
them had had no desire to become ASW Officers. After suffi-
cient exposure to all facets of the surface warfare area, a
junior officer should be given an opportunity to state a bil-
let preference and serve in that position if possible. Offi-
cers who become ASW Officers must be those who want to pursue
that particular field, not those who are in the position
because the Commanding Officer told them that they were the
only ones available to take over the job.
Hall (1976) in his book, "Careers in Organizations", has
devised a career development cycle which he felt was appli-
cable to anyone involved in pursuing a chosen career. This
cycle is shown in Figure 1.
The position of ASW Officer must not be regarded as simply
another job enroute to numerous other unrelated jobs. The
importance of ASW must be instilled in young officers early
in their careers. Then, once involved in an ASW career devel-
opment plan, greater effort needs to be exerted to ensure that
the ASW Officer's self-esteem and job satisfaction are kept
at a high level. Failure to do so could result in a situa-
tion where an officer simply wants to avoid failure and there-
fore, does what he needs to do to get by, rather than aspire
to improve and grow.
An unfortunate situation which has existed in recent years























training. This has presented a very real morale problem in
the ASW Officer community because these officers have been
unable to apply the training and knowledge which they have
acquired directly to their work. In the ASW Officer survey
taken in San Diego, the majority of the officers indicated
they had not been given enough at-sea training to adequately
test applications which they had been taught in ASWO School.
As a result, many ASW Officers did not feel competent nor
comfortable in their work. On-the-job training is such a
useful tool that serious consequences could result if this
training continues to be limited. The officers interviewed
felt that they had little time left over to involve themselves
in ASW after their division officer duties and collateral duty
requirements had been satisfied. The average time the offi-
cers spent actively involved in ASW aboard their ships was
approximately ten percent.
IV. A PROPOSED ASW SPECIALIST CAREER PATTERN
There has never been any clear evidence of a career plan
which has led to the development of an ASW specialist in the
surface warfare community. This has resulted in a dangerous
gap in the knowledge and experience of Destroyer ASW officers
as compared with ASW aviators and ASW submariners.
In the summer of 1972, the Operational Technical Managerial
System (OTMS) was established. The purpose of this system was
to ensure that the unrestricted line officer be given the
opportunity to increase both his technical/managerial expertise
20

and his operational expertise. An officer could become a
proven subspecialist with a high degree of competence and
experience in a subspecialty field. It was recognized also
that an officer could become a proven subspecialist by know-
ledge gained through repeated exposure to a given field, as
well as postgraduate education.
The need for Naval Officers to possess the knowledge and
experience to deal with a more sophisticated Navy has become
apparent and many subspecialty areas have been identified.
Included in the OTMS is the proven subspecialist in Anti-
submarine Warfare, indicating, at least on paper, that ASW
has been regarded as an area important enough to require
specialization. Appendix B is an excerpt from OPNAVINST
1211. 6E dated 10 April 1975, which lists the subspecialty
fields currently recognized by the Navy.
A sampling of ninety (90) 1110 surface warfare officers
who had held surface command was taken in order to determine
subspecialty development. The type ships the officers had
commanded included FF's, DD's, DDG ' s , and DE/DEG's, and thus
were ships which should have been actively involved in ASW.
Not one of the ninety commanding officers sampled possessed
a subspecialty code in Anti-Submarine Warfare. The largest
concentration of officers were proven subspecialists in
Weapons Systems Technology, with the subspecialty codes of
the other officers ranging from General and Transportation
Management to Chemistry and Physics. Five (5) commanding
officers had not attained any type of subspecialty coding.
21

A breakdown of the various subspecialty codes and number of
















Two statements can be made concerning this sampling: (1)
Commanding Officers have been able to specialize and concen-
trate their efforts in a particular field, yet obviously were
not hampered in becoming Commanding Officers, and (2) the
complete lack of any ASW subspecialists in the sample indicated
that Anti-submarine Warfare has not received the command atten-
tion it justly deserves.
Officers must now be given the opportunity to expand their
ASW knowledge and experience. This would be done by establish-
ing a career which would allow them to receive in-depth ASW
training as well as being able to serve in interrelated ASW
billets both ashore and afloat. Figure 2 is a proposed career
pattern for a Surface Warfare Officer desiring to become a
proven subspe cialist in ASW.
The major deviation from the standard Surface Warfare
Officer career pattern is the two to four month in-depth ASW
training following SWOS Department Head School. This training
22

CAREER PATTERN FOR ASW EXPERIENCED SURFACE



























SEA STAFF - ASW RELATED BILLET
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY
ASW CURRICULUM (525)
SEA - WEAPONS OR OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT HEAD
IN DEPTH ASH TRAINING (2-4 MONTHS)
SWOS DEPARTMENT HEAD SCHOOL




would be a continuation of previous ASW training with sub-
jects being covered in greater detail due to the additional
time allotted for study. Upon completion of this school and
Department Head School, an officer would then be placed in
billets in which he could best utilize his ASW expertise for
the benefit of the Navy. "PERS 403B Billet Designators with
ASW Utilization", dated 0^-29-77, listed the following ASW
related billets available for LCDR's, CDR's, and CAPT's who




NAVPGSCOL Ass't ASW Curr. Officer
CINCLANTFLT Surf Surv Officer
COMOPTEVFOR Sonar Ops Test/Eval Ass't
FLT ASW TRALANT/PAC ASW Instructors






CARGRU Surf Ops ASW
COMSURFLANT/PAC Staff (ASW)




OPNAV OP 955F, OP 955B, OP 353
2H

It is obvious that there is potential for officers to remain
in ASW related billets as their careers progress. Junior
officers would still be required to become familiar with all
aspects of the engineering system aboard ship. The require-
ments for completing the Engineering PQS program, either in
the gas turbine plant or the steam plant, and receiving a
Surface Warfare Junior Engineering Officer of the Watch (JEOOW)
designation would be maintained.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ASW systems have grown to such a complex state that the
proper utilization of these systems and the proficiency of
all those involved in ASW, demands the establishment and con-
tinuation of an ASW specialist program. The "well-rounded"
officer concept should be a thing of the past. The need for
specialization has long been recognized by the Navy in the
aviation and submarine communities. Increased sophistication
requires a similar level of specialization in the surface ASW
community.
The establishment of an ASW Officer career plan would be
the catalyst needed to propel surface ASW to a position equal
in proficiency to aviation and subsurface ASW. Training now
available to an ASW Officer lacks the time and Command atten-
tion needed to ensure that an officer become a proficient ASVl
specialist. This training requires considerable improvement
and attention to modern ASW systems and tactics presently in
25

use. An improved, in-depth training program and greater Com-
mand attention can only lead to ASW Officers who feel more
competent and knowledgeable in the field of ASW and as a
result, willing to become more involved and raise their levels
of expertise to even higher degrees. Brandenburg (196U)
states very effectively the need for the necessary changes in
the surface ASW picture
:
"The only way to cope with the situation is to grow
right along with the data year by hear, as it accumu-
lates; learning, sifting, discarding, collecting,
collating, understanding on a day-to-day basis, remain-
ing constantly abreast of the state of the art. Anti-
submarine Warfare is ever changing. Yet much depends
today upon knowing which weapons and tactics worked well
in the past and which did not and why. Likewise, much
depends on being able to correlate the experience and
knowledge of the past with the information and hypo-
theses of today in order to understand the weapons and
tactics of tomorrow."
It is recommended that considerably more attention now be
given to the revitalization of an Anti-Submarine Warfare Spe-
cialist Career Pattern. The career plan should include
extended training time both at the Fleet Anti-Submarine War-
fare Officers Schools and on board ship, plus a progression
of interrelated ASW billets available to the ASW specialist
in order for him to accumulate the vast amount of detailed
knowledge available.
The Fleet ASW Officer School in San Diego states as its
mission for the ASWO course:
"The basic mission of this course is to provide com-
petent Anti-Submarine Weapons Officers who are capa-
ble of employing sonar and associated ASW weapons
systems in all phases of anti-submarine warfare;
training an effective sonar and anti-submarine weapons
organization; and administering the maintenance pro-
grams of ASW Equipment".
26

This goal has not been fully realized and will continue to
fall short if changes are not immediately made in the pre-
sent training program. Appendix C is the questionnaire given
to various ASW officers in the San Diego area. It dealt in
part with the adequacies or inadequacies of the present ASW
training program for officers. Included in the questionnaire
was a question requesting ideas on improving the training
situation. The following changes and improvements were rec-
ommended by the officers sampled: (1) Ensure trainer time is
spent on modern sonar equipment vice obsolete equipment. (2)
There should be a greater coverage of equipment capabilities
and limitations. (3) Much more time should be spent in the
trainers on the sonar equipment installed on the different
ships to which the officers will be going. (4) Greater empha-
sis should be placed on the importance and capabilities of
passive ASW operations. (5) There should be considerably more
cross-training with the air and subsurface communities. (6)
Either an annual or semi-annual ASWO refresher course should
be established where ASWO can come together to discuss prob-
lems encountered and receive information and training on new
equipment and tactics. These recommendations and changes can
only become effective if the depth of instruction improves
and if a group of interrelated billets be made available to
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Classroom Lab/Trainer
Hrs. Hrs.











Range Prediction for Planning
Passive Range Prediction
Regional Oceanography and Advanced Concepts
III. INTRODUCTION TO ACOUSTIC SURFACE ASW SENSOR SYSTEMS 17
Concepts of Acoustic Sensors
Basic Sonar System
Sonar Operating Procedures
Operational Characteristics of AN/SQS-23
Operational Characteristics of AN7SQS-26/53
Operational Characteristics of AN/SOQ-23
Operational Characteristics of AN7SQS-35/38
Acoustic Processors
Towed Array Sonar Systems
IV. UNDERWATER BATTERY FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS (UBFCS) 8
MK 114/111 Fire Control Systems
MK 116 Fire Control System
MK 309 Firing Panel
V. ASW WEAPONS 3.5
MK 46 Mod 1 Torpedo





MK 16 ASROC Launching Group
Missile Launching System MK 10






Operational Characteristics of Submarines
Basic Submarine Tactics
Soviet Submarine Capabilities and Limitations
Soviet Submarine Sensors and Weapons
U.S. Submarine Capabilities, Limitations,
Sensors and Weapons
VIII. ASW DOCTRINE 32




Urgent and Deliberate Attacks
Trainer Brief
Basic Maneuvering
Weapon System Selection Procedures




Surface Attack Units (SAU)
Attack, Support, and Search Methods and Plans
Dual Ship Operation (Tactical #1) Basic
Maneuvering and Screen Formation
Sonar System Employment
Acoustic Warfare
Allied ASW Weapons and Sensors
ASW in Inshore Waters
Dual Ship Operation (Tactical //2) SAU
Formation and Approach to DATLT4
Dual Ship Operation (Tactical //3) SAU
Formation and Approach to DATUM
Dual Ship Operation (Attack #1) DATUM Approach
and Contact Phase (Staff SAUC)
Dual Ship Operation (Attack ''2) DATUM Approach
and Contact Phase (Student SAUC)
Coordinated Operation (Tactical ''1) Surface Ship
and ASW Aircraft Against Diesel Submarine
Coordinated Operation (Tactical ','2) Surface Ship
and ASW Aircraft Against Nuclear Submarine
Coordinated Operation (Tactical '-3) Passive/Active
Operation with ASW Aircraft
Coordinated Operation (Attack //I) Single Ship and
and ASW Aircraft
Coordinated Operation (Attack ''2) Dual Ship and
and ASW Aircraft





IX. UNDERWATER BATTERY ATTACK PROCEDURES
f ASROC Attacks from Underwater Battery
' ASROC Attack //I (Single Shot)
ASROC Attack //2 (Dual ATP-28) with Multiple Echo




ASROC Attack //4 (Test)
j
Surface Vessel Torpedo Tube (SVTT) Attacks from UB
i Stack Attacks
1 SVTT Attack //I (Single Shot with 0° Gyro)
I
SVTT Attack #2 (Dual ATP-28) with TCM)
i SVTT Attack #3 (Dual (Shoot-Listen-Shoot) with TCM
X. CASUALTY PROCEDURES 6.5
ASROC and SVTT Attack #1 with Casualties
ASROC and SVTT Attack #2 with Casualties
UB Performance Test
XI. ASW AIRCRAFT 2








XIII. MATERIAL MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT 11
Noise Problems, Noise Reduction and Surveys
ASW System Alignment
ASW System Readiness Checks
Material Maintenance Management
Electrical Safety











XV. ORDNANCE SAFETY AND WEAPON MANAGEMENT 8
Ordnance Safety and Security
Magazine Sprinkler Systems
Torpedo Handling
Weapon Logistics Logs, Records and Reports
ASROC Heating and Cooling System





XVII. AN/SQS-23 SON.\R SYSTEM 16
Principles of Operation and Functions
of the AN/SQS-23 Sonar System
AN/SQS-23 Sonar System: Modification and
Field Changes
AN/SQS-23 Sonar System Maintenance
AN/SQS-23 Sonar System Operation
AN/SQS-23 Sonar Range Prediction
AN/SQS-23 Sonar System Employment Considerations
AN/SQS-23 Unit Exam and Review
XVIII. AN/SQS-26/53 SONAR SYSTEM 22
AN/SQS-26/53 Transmitter Sub-System
AN/SQS-26/53 Receiver, Display and Control
Subsystem
AN/SQS-26/53 Power Supply Subsystem

















XIX. AN/SQQ-23 (PAIR) SONAR SYSTEM
16
AN/SQQ-23 Transmit Subsystem
AN/SQQ-23 Receiver, Display, and Control
Subsystem













AN/SQQ-23 Unit Examination 'and Review















AN/SQS-35(V) Unit Exam and Review
7 8
XXI. AN/SQS-38 SONAR SYSTEM
















XXII. INTEGRATED ACOUSTIC COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (lACS)
Introduction to the Integrated Acoustic





lACS Unit Examination and Review
7
XXIII. TOWED ARRAY SONARS
Towed Array Equipment Characteristics
Modes of Operation
Array Operation
Equipment Operation and Monitoring
Search and Contact Procedures
Towed Array Maintenance














Fundamental Frequencies and Harmonics
Sound Sources
Tactical Information from LOFARgram
Analysis
LOFARgram Examination
XXVI. BASIC ASW PASSIVE PLOTTING TECHNIQUES AND PLOTS
Introduction to Target Motion Analysis
Passive Plotting Organization and Basic
Passive Plots
Time Bearing Plot





Practical Use of Passive Plots














EDUCATION AND SKILL P'^IELDS
AND
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XX20 Political Science (Note 1)
XX21 Mid East, Africa, or
South Asia




XX25 Intl Organizations and
Negotiations
XX26 Strategic Planning (General) CNO (Op-06)
XX27 Strategic Planning (Nuclear) CNO (Op-06)
XX28 Joint and Strategic
Intelligence CNO (Op-009)
XX29 Naval Intelligence
Scientific and Technical CNO (Op-009)
Management
XX30 Management (General) (Note 1) CHNAVMAT




XX35 Transportation Mgmt (MSC)
XX36 Manpower and Personnel
Management
XX37 Education and Training
Management
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Oceanography and Hydrography OCEANAV












XX60 Weapons Systems Engineering
(Note 1)
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XX6 3 Physics COMNAVSKA
XX64 Weapons Electronics COMNAVSEA
XX65 Electro-Optics & Lasers COMNAVSEA
XX66 Nuclear Physics COMNAVSEA
XX67 Nuclear Effects COMNAVSEA
XX68 Strategic Weapons (FBM) DIRSSP
XX69 Strategic Navigation (FPM) DIRSSP
Aeronautical Systems Engineering






















































XX 91 Computer Science (General)
XX 9 2 Computer Science (Combat
Direction System s)
XX 9 3 Computer Science
Support System.s)
(Command




XX 9 S Computer Systems (General
)
XX 9 6 Computer Systems (Combat
Direction System si
XX 9/ Computer Systems
Support Systems)
(Command
XX ^8 Computer Systems
C-^ntrol )
( Resource
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PLEASE COMMENT ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE TRAINING YOU RECEIVED
AT THE FLEET ASWO SCHOOL:
1. Ignored modem developments and equipment
2. Information aimed at WW II ASW tactics.
3. No passive ASW studied.
4. Destroyer only type ops studied — no coordinated ops.
5. Scope of training adequate but many subjects not given
proper amount of time for in-depth appreciation.
6. "Trainer" time limited.
7. Limited time spent on ASW weapons.
8. Training for multi-ship or coordinated ASW very limited.
WHAT IMPROVEMENTS, IF ANY, WOULD YOU MAKE TO THIS TRAINING?
1. More cross-training with air and sub-surface communities
2. Greater emphasis on passive ops.
3. Greater coverage of equipment capabilities and limita-
tions.
4. Greater time in trainers.
5. More trainer time on modern equipment vice obsolete
equipment
.
6. ASWO refresher course, either annually or semi-annually.
HOW MUCH OF YOUR TIME ON BOARD SHIP IS SPENT ON ASW?
Approximately 10% overall.
IF THERE WERE A CAREER PATTERN FOR AN ASWO SPECIALIST WOULD YOU
PURSUE SUCH A CAREER?
Would pursue: 6 3%
Had no desire: 37%
WAS IT YOUR DESIRE TO BECOME AN ASW OFFICER?
YES: 50%
NO : 5 %
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